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The article argues that the West is looking for a stalemate instead of a 
victory in Afghanistan, even if this statement requires further clarification in the 
sense of specifying what would happen to the key actors in the conceived 
stalemated situation. The article first provides an overview of the discourse in 
West about “stalemate in Afghanistan,” then examines Western strategy in the 
light of key decision-makers’ statements and noteworthy developments on the 
ground. It then concludes with an analysis of what sort of stalemate constitutes 
Western aims in Afghanistan and how it is hoped to be achieved, as well as 
with an assessment of the enormous difficulties this strategy faces, profoundly 
questioning its validity. 
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Introduction 
 
A closer meaning of “stalemate” is a situation in which two parties or 
players deadlock each other. Neither can make a further move. In the game of 
chess this entails that neither can make a legal move, including the player who 
ought to move. In contrast, in conflict resolution, stalemate usually implies a 
mutually hurting situation, where the parties may be looking for a Way Out 
depending on whether they perceive that there is a mutually and sufficiently 
enticing opportunity, perhaps with the aid of mediation by third parties. In the 
negotiation process it certainly helps if they have valid spokespersons and it is 
important that a protracted hurting stalemate must not deepen hostility of the 
two parties and that they remain sensitive to the hurting nature of their situation. 
In a nutshell, that is how the moment may become “ripe” for conflict resolution.1 
 
                                                 
1
 ZARTMAN, William (2001): The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. In: The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2001, p. 8-18.  
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In Afghanistan, not a single one of the above criteria may be present for a 
stalemate and a ripe moment for conflict resolution, even if momentarily the 
situation clearly is hurting for all involved. The puzzle investigated in this 
chapter is how, in spite of this, there is much talk about a stalemate in 
Afghanistan, and why, if there is a challenge to this, it comes mostly in the form 
of a defence of the Afghanistan effort alluding to how the war can still be won, 
even as the current Afghan government is told it should reconcile and 
prospectively share power with the Taliban. The reason for what at first sight 
may seem an odd constellation of affairs is found to lay partly in the realities of 
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, partly in the mundane world of 
electoral politics, and partly in the cognitive processes of Western decision-
makers. 
 
The discourse on “stalemate in Afghanistan” 
 
Stalemate has become a trending word in the context of the Afghanistan 
conflict. Google’s search engine was able to retrieve 13,600,000 hits for 
“Afghanistan stalemate,” while Bing found 861,000 (on 12 September 2012). In 
the summer of 2012, the New York Times has even written of the family feud 
between Mahmoud Karzai and Shah Wali Karzai, two brothers of President 
Hamed Karzai, upon the latter’s alleged illicit transfer of $55 million from the 
family company funds to his own corporation, as one where “the two sides 
settled into a bitter stalemate.”2 Google Trends measures a relative rise of search 
activity related to the keywords “Afghanistan, stalemate” for the period of June 
2009 to May 2012.
3
 
 
A review of one and a half years’ contents4 in the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and various other major newspapers may offer a particularly 
illustrative sample of references to a stalemate in or related to Afghanistan. It 
reveals that “stalemate” is usually implied in a vague and varying sense to refer 
to various different confliction situations between different dyads of actors. 
Some of the causal mechanisms assumed to play a role in creating these 
                                                 
2
 RISEN, James (2012): Intrigue in Karzai Family as an Afghan Era Closes. New York Times, 4 June 2012. At 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/world/asia/karzai-family-moves-to-protect-its-privilege.html?  
pagewanted=all (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
3
 From http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=Afghanistan%2C%20stalemate&cmpt=q, as retrieved on 10 
October 2012. 
4
 That is, since the official end of the take-off phase of the U.S. surge effort, and the beginning of troop 
drawdowns. 
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stalemates are hinted at, but no systematic attempt can be observed to link up the 
various different stalemates into a comprehensive assessment of the conflict 
complex. This may have to do with the Matryoshka-doll nature of the war in 
Afghanistan: it constitutes a set of conflicts within other conflicts escaping a 
narrow definition by reference to clearly delineated actors and parties. 
 
 Frequently it is the conflict between the West and the Taliban that is 
deemed a stalemate. Most recently, experienced residents of Kandahar, Alex 
Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn write in the New York Times, concerning 
the designation of the Haqqani faction within the Taliban insurgency as a 
terrorist organisation, which qualification will not help as “there can be no 
winner in the current stalemate”. They base this partly on the claim that “the 
industrial-scale targeting of midlevel Taliban commanders in Afghanistan has 
led to the rise of a younger, more uncompromising generation of leaders.”5 
Other observers and pundits add their say, too, to the debate. One source speaks 
of an impasse in a dynamic sense: gains in southern Afghanistan as a result of 
the surge of mostly U.S. troops to the war theatre may have pushed the 
insurgency to other areas.
6
 Another source describes a “perpetually escalating 
stalemate.”7 Yet another one implies stalemate in its conventional, static sense, 
speaking of “a complete stalemate” on the political front while war is raging.8 
Meanwhile, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann warns 
that “transition has to be toward a defined goal, not a cliff over which we 
tumble;” in a circular argument he then claims that therefore negotiations are 
necessary with the insurgents, hopefully not to be broken by the “current 
stalemate.”9 
 
Contrary to these sources, reacting to press reports in February 2012 in the 
wake of the leaking of a classified NATO report on the situation in Afghanistan, 
                                                 
5
 VON LINSCHOTEN, Alex Strick and KÜHN, Felix (2012): A Pointless Blacklisting. New York Times, 12 
September 2012. At http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/opinion/blacklisting-an-afghan-network-is-
pointless.html?_r=1& (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
6
 SHASHANK, Joshi (2012): Afghanistan heads towards a messy, unresolved stalemate. Telegraph, 19 
September 2012. At http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/shashankjoshi/100181834/afghanistan-heads-towards-a-
messy-unresolved-stalemate/ (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
7
 STAR, Alexander (2011): Afghanistan: What the Anthropologists Say. New York Times, 20 November 2011. At 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/books/review/afghanistan-and-other-books-about-rebuilding-book-
review.html?pagewanted=all  (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
8
 KHATTAK, Afrasiab (2011): Stalemate in Afghanistan. Dawn, 15 November 2011. At 
http://dawn.com/2011/11/15/stalemate-in-afghanistan/ (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
9
 NEUMANN, Ronald E. (2012): U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Washington Post, 13 
February 2012. At http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-troops-will-remain-in-afghanistan-beyond-
2014/2012/02/13/gIQA3lxFOR_story.html (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
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CIA Director David Petraeus denied that this report described a stalemate in 
Afghanistan: “We did a word search for the word ‘stalemate’ (…) it is not in 
there,” he said,10 even as he tried to maintain a semblance of objectivity related 
to the US intelligence community’s own assessment of the Afghan conflict, 
similarly referring to a deadlocked situation (in a National Intelligence Estimate 
or NIE).
11
 “Twice I thought the assessment was too negative… Two other times, 
I felt that the community was actually too positive,” Petraeus related.12 Similarly 
to him, Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta also attempted to counter the notion 
of a stalemate in the NIE, calling 2011 a “significant turning point [for the 
better].”13 
 
 As seen here, in these instances stalemate may be both political and 
military, static as well as dynamic, and either mutually hurting or hurting to a 
more general collective of e.g. “Afghans.” Three of the above sources speak of a 
dynamic military stalemate (“insurgent leaders are replaced with ones even more 
committed to the fighting”; “insurgents pressured in one area merely move to 
another area”; “hostilities escalating and the number of violent incidents as well 
as combatants on both sides growing, without a change of outcome”). One 
source speaks of a static military stalemate whereby negotiations are necessary 
to bring about lasting results (“if you take the military out and there is no deal in 
the meantime, transition leads nowhere”), while another focuses on the political 
impasse (“they do not negotiate, and Afghan blood is being spilt in the 
meantime”). At the same time, decision-makers with personal stakes in 
producing military victory (Petraeus or Panetta) seek to deny that there may be a 
stalemate as any non-winning situation is inconvenient for them to 
acknowledge, even in the face of opposition to a relatively upbeat assessment by 
other voices within U.S. government. 
 
Notably, this proliferation of utterances of a stalemate comes in the wake 
of long years throughout the course of which phrases such as “we are winning 
every battle, but we cannot win the war” [stalemate] and that “we have our 
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MILLER, Greg (2012): Petraeus, with plenty of practice, sticks to message. Washington Post – Checkpoint 
Washington, 3 February 2012. At http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/petraeus-
with-plenty-of-practice-sticks-to-message/2012/02/03/gIQA8kwJnQ_blog.html (downloaded on 14 January 
2013). 
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IGNATIUS, David (2012): Panetta suggests earlier Afghan withdrawal. Washington Post – Post-Partisan, 1 
February 2012. At http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/panetta-afghanistan-withdrawl-
begins-and-ends-with-politics/2012/02/01/gIQAmoaliQ_blog.html (downloaded on 14 January 2013). 
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 MILLER, 2012, op. cit.  
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 IGNATIUS, 2012, op. cit. 
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watches, but the Taliban has time” [a losing situation] have long become 
common parlance. In various locales across Afghanistan, from Now Zad in 
Helmand province to the Korengal valley in Kunar province, different military 
units have come to lethal local stalemates with insurgents: being able to take 
terrain temporarily but unable to hold all of it with less than enough men, 
experiencing stalemate primarily in terms of (missing) mass of manpower.
14
 
Other, distinct sources focus on the structure of Afghan politics and speak of a 
longer-term impasse in the sense of “structural anarchy” (as e.g. Reyna uses the 
term
15), where “no one is truly in charge” because although “local power brokers 
might possess wealth, honor, a reputation for piety, abundant weaponry or 
powerful allies, but they [lack] the means or the will to convert those gifts into 
decisive authority,”16 a constellation studied in general within the “failed state” 
literature. 
 
 “Stuck in a stalemate” has in the meantime become a recurring expression 
to describe the state of affairs facing the Pakistani military in Pakistan’s 
borderlands,
17
 where in the words of one of the sources just quoted “a witches’ 
brew of militants” may be holding Pakistani forces at bay. 
 
 Such understanding of the difficulties faced by Pakistani troops stands in 
contrast with varyingly open talk of conflict with Pakistan itself. Especially in 
the wake of the November 2011 Mohmand incident where soldiers of Pakistan’s 
Frontier Corps were killed in a NATO/US airstrike and Pakistan decided to 
close its land borders to ISAF supplies into Afghanistan, the press regularly 
talked of “bitter stalemate”18 related to “countless matters” of which the 
November 2011 incident was but one. The structural flaws or incompatibilities 
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PHILLIPS, Michael M. (2009): Stalemate. Wall Street Journal, 23 May 2009. At 
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REYNA, Steve (2002): Imagining monsters : a structural history of warfare in Chad (1968-1990). In: 
Friedman, Jonathan, ed.: Globalization, the State and Violence. Walnut Creek, Altamira, 2002. 
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 STAR, 2011, op. cit. 
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 See e.g. SCHMITT, Eric (2011): U.S. Prepares for a Curtailed Relationship With Pakistan. New York Times, 
26 December 2011. At http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/world/asia/us-preparing-for-pakistan-to-restrict-
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   both downloaded on 14 January 2013. 
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of the relationship have been addressed with various telling terms such as “red 
lines [need to be drawn]” or that “recalculating [is needed].” Pakistani and U.S. 
sources have been quoted as saying that “Both countries recognize the benefits 
of partnering against common threats, but those must be [continuously] balanced 
against national interests as well” and that it may be “better to have a 
predictable, more focused relationship than an incredibly ambitious out-of-
control relationship,” respectively.19 From the Pakistani part, demands for an all-
weather partnership encounter the selective momentary interest in cooperation 
on the part of the United States. Reminiscent of the end of the 1980s war against 
the Soviet Union and its allies in Afghanistan in the wake of which Pakistani 
officers likened their treatment by the U.S. to being “a condom that can be 
flushed down the toilet,” a Pakistani Muslim League (Q) politician is quoted as 
saying that Pakistan feels “like a rainy-day girlfriend [of the United States].”20 
Needless to say, these existing structural tensions of the relationship are 
aggravated by those countless other matters mentioned above, most importantly 
the drone campaign which is, however, key to the U.S. policy in the region: 
serving as it is the elimination of al-Qaida and its bases in Pakistani areas. 
 
 A further and final strand of discourse in the press about stalemate relates 
to the latter, pivotal conflict which itself triggered U.S. and Western 
involvement in the region post-9-11. The clash with radical Islamists may have 
produced a major degradation of the capabilities of al-Qaida, impeding it in 
functioning as a key node for Jihadi networks globally, but we may still be far 
from a similarly reassuring condition on the global level, looking across the 
entire Islamic world – turbulent as the latter is as a result of the “Arab Spring” 
and the complicated times that followed it. As a result, Ian Bremmer and David 
Gordon speak, with special regard to the West’s uncertain attitude towards 
rebels in Syria, of a stalemate there that makes “rhetorical or military support for 
the Syrian opposition from the United States, Turkey or Saudi Arabia very 
difficult.”21 
 
 In contrast to the widespread use of the term in the press, one does not 
encounter the word stalemate as particularly often used in academic literature. 
Only a few journal articles use the word at all in some context related to 
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 SCHMITT, 2011, op. cit.  
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 Ibid.  
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 BREMMER, Ian and GORDON, David (2012): Battling the Qaeda Hydra. New York Times, 28 March 2012. 
At http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/opinion/battling-the-qaeda-hydra.html?pagewanted=all (downloaded 
on 14 January 2013). 
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Afghanistan. Tondini uses the term in its most common military context and 
sense, while Chaudhuri and Farrell refer to a stalemate in Indo-Pakistani 
relations.
22
 Roberts’ article stands out as one addressing the issue of a possible 
stalemate in Afghanistan in more depth. He calls for alternative policies, seeing 
no prospect of a “clear victory [for the Kabul government].” He refers to 
“combining fighting and talking” as a strategy possibly leading to a stalemate 
which is not necessarily as bad as it is difficult in his view: given the Taliban’s 
perception that they are in a position of future strength.
23
 
 
 This does not mean that the existing scholarly literature on Afghanistan 
has failed to deal with the problems of conflict resolution. To the contrary, and 
this speaks of the impracticality of framing the current situation as a stalemate in 
the sense of two parties keeping each other indirectly in check regardless of how 
much decision-makers and the media use the term. Providing a less than full 
inventory here: Bapat (2010) warns of moral hazards in the negotiation process 
on the side of Hamed Karzai’s administration who may not be interested in 
seeing the U.S. leave;
24
 Giustozzi (2007; 2008), MacGinty (2010) and others 
write of the conflict relationship between the West and the Kabul government on 
the one hand, and the up-to-this-day powerful commander-politicians from the 
former Northern Alliance on the other;
25
 Nixon and Ponzio (2007) and Fänge 
(2010) among others address the troubled relationship between local and 
centralising forces in Afghanistan;
26
 Tadjbakhsh (2010) as well as Schmeidl and 
Karokhail (2009) address the disadvantages of the neoliberal paradigm of state-
building and cultural and institutional sources of resistance to it locally;
27
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Marton and Hynek (2011) investigate conflicts within the state-building and 
security-assistance coalition itself;
28
 while others such as van Bijlert (2009) or 
Foschini (2010), to name but a few examples, have written extensively about the 
extremely complicated web of local conflicts in locales such as Uruzgan and 
Baghlan provinces, in the south and the north of Afghanistan, respectively – 
including conflicts in the insurgents’ own ranks and between their various 
factions.
29
 
 
Needless to say, to this list of complications of the conflict with as well as 
within Pakistan be added. The latter seals the deadlock of the conflict complex, 
and in fact “stalemate” as a description may best fit to the U.S.-Pakistani 
relationship as such – the inherent constraints to what the U.S. can do in 
Afghanistan mean that the U.S. has to operate with certain extra-legal moves 
(such as plausibly deniable drone strikes and unauthorised special forces raids) 
at least sometimes, but choosing the timing and treading very carefully on such 
occasions. Notably, in these cases it is acting primarily not for the sake of a 
victorious resolution of the Afghan conflict but rather in the framework of its 
conflict with the global Jihadi movement – targeting al-Qaida as well as the 
faction regarded as one of its key local allies, the Haqqani faction. 
 
Western decision-making and strategy: in the hope of constructive 
stalemating 
 
President Obama made one of his key decisions about Afghanistan policy 
on 11 November 2009, the occasion of the eighth meeting of the Afghanistan 
war review process he had initiated. He pushed the curve showing planned 
troop-level changes to the left on the time axis, on a graph he and his team had 
studied and contemplated exhaustively by then. Inbound troops would first 
elevate the overall number of troops in the Afghan theatre and then reach a 
reversal or inflection point whereby it would start diminishing in the wake of the 
beginning of troop withdrawals, over the span of eighteen months altogether – a 
period the President was interested in sliding forth in time. The decision was a 
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calculated gamble, described as early as in December 2009 as “betting that a 
quick jolt of extra forces could knock the enemy back on its heels enough for the 
Afghans to take over the fight.”30 
 
 By this time, the guerrilla war in Afghanistan had consistently 
deteriorated on a year-on-year basis since the very beginning of the Afghanistan 
mission. 2005 saw significant escalation as a result of a number of factors and 
saw the introduction of the mass use of tactics familiar from the Iraqi guerrilla 
war: IEDs and suicide bombings. The trend in all kinds of incidents was 
pointing clearly upwards. Seasonality made these curves bend up and down 
following the rhythm of the guerrilla season, with a relative drop in violence 
over the winter periods. Yet these low points registered higher and higher as 
time progressed. Insecurity was growing in all parts of the country, even in 
hitherto relatively safe, peaceful districts. 
 
Obama inherited this war from the Bush administration, faced with the 
task of stemming the tide. More importantly, however, he had a realistic chance 
of dealing a decisive blow to al-Qaida, the organisation that triggered U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan in the first place. The means to this end was now 
available in the form of drone strikes which first significantly escalated over the 
last year of the Bush administration. Obama himself came to office with a right-
of-centre foreign policy position, with a pledge to be firm on national security 
issues, including the possibility of putting more pressure on Pakistan and 
pursuing terrorists there. 
 
Without quite understanding how or why this would work, the brunt of the 
surge effort was eventually directed to southern Afghanistan, with a lesser focus 
on eastern Afghanistan. This may not have been an ideal allocation of forces, 
but over the course of the following two years the insurgency’s rise was 
eventually arrested. Violence did remain at very high levels (higher than pre-
surge levels in fact), but in some dimensions even a decrease could be observed, 
including in the crucial category of direct-fire incidents, possibly one of the best 
measures of an insurgency’s vitality. Enemy-initiated attacks showed year-on-
year monthly decreases from 2011 to 2012 in the crucial regions of south, 
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southwest, and east.
31
 Insurgents have, however, adapted to the changed 
circumstances with shifts in the focus of their activity, and began efforts at 
destabilising from the inside the very Afghan armed forces that were being built 
up against them, orchestrating green-on-blue incidents with the strategic aim of 
undermining “partnered” ISAF-Afghan military operations. In this, they have 
achieved remarkable success, even as NATO claims that perhaps only as much 
as 25 percent of these attacks may be truly insurgent-organised.
32
 This is 
happening parallel to continuing defections, including straight into the 
insurgency’s ranks,33 and to mounting losses of the Afghan army which may 
have suffered fatal casualties in the order of 1,000 in 2012, a 20% increase over 
2011.
34
  
 
The dubious achievement of turning the trends in other incident categories 
came upon a 33,000-strong troop reinforcement by the Obama administration: 
47,000 less than what the U.S. military was originally requesting.
35
 The eventual 
decision about the surge came on 23 November 2011, and was in favour of 
“Option 2A” on the table, informally dubbed “Max Leverage.”36 
 
 As part of a strategy of “fight, build, and talk”, the leverage of an 
increased fighting force offered no better hope than an elongated time frame 
over which the Taliban could be engaged in negotiations, would perhaps feel the 
pressure to do so, but would still have the ultimate strategic advantage of its 
staying power in the face of the overwhelming but at the same time transient 
phenomenon of U.S. and coalition military presence. In the best-case, but 
certainly not the most realistic, scenario, the Taliban’s and other insurgent 
groups’ capabilities would be degraded sufficiently to force them to agree to a 
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binding agreement, including a pledge not to work with al-Qaida and other 
global jihadi organisations in the future, so strategists seemed to hope. 
 
 Pakistan’s role was and is equally seen as crucial in this respect. A 
classified report last year leaked to the BBC showed that Western intelligence 
services, based partly on interrogations of Taliban personnel, continue to see the 
ISI as “thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior 
Taliban personnel.” Furthermore, according to their information “Senior Taliban 
representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the 
immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad, Pakistan” while “The 
Haqqani family, for example, resides immediately west of the ISI office at the 
airfield in Miram Shah.”37 The hope in this respect seems to be that if the West 
offers Pakistan the prospect of lasting cooperation, i.e. no full abandonment 
upon the exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan may be interested in making sure that 
the Taliban, or the Haqqanis for that matter, are separated from the global jihadi 
movement and Afghanistan does not become the latter’s base once again. In 
fact, the designation of the Haqqani faction as a terrorist organization already 
seems to point in the alternative direction of threatening Pakistan with being 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, should it not find cooperation with the 
West good enough a deal – although U.S. officials deny this publicly.38 
Naturally, for Pakistan calculations include not only the U.S.-Pakistan-
Afghanistan triangular relationship but a view to the South Asian security 
complex and for example the growing U.S.-India partnership as well, making 
this a complicated choice for them. 
 
 With regard to such complications, U.S. strategy “has to keep the 
gunpowder dry.” Besides intentions to maintain a strong Special Operations 
Forces presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, a particularly telling 
aspect of preparing for coming eventualities is the way some officials talk of the 
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program. The latter is a dubiously feasible plan 
involving, in its most simple version, the use of ballistic missiles with 
conventional or other non-WMD warheads which could provide for the 
capability of striking a target within a short amount of time (“promptly,” 
almost). Feasibility is questionable given how such missiles would fly on a 
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trajectory over other nuclear powers’ territories, risking unwanted consequences. 
A 2009 article in International Security nevertheless reckoned with the 
possibility of taking out “emerging, time-sensitive, soft targets, such as exposed 
WMD launchers, terrorist leaders, and sites of state transfers of WMD to 
terrorists or other states within roughly one hour of a decision to attack,” unlike 
in the case of the 1998 strikes at training camps in Afghanistan (in the wake of 
the East African Embassy bombings) which took far more time to prepare and 
execute.
39
 Others have made similar points.
40
 The assumption has become so 
commonplace that in a 2010 piece the New York Times introduced PGS simply 
as “Called Prompt Global Strike, the new weapon is designed to carry out tasks 
like picking off Osama bin Laden in a cave, if the right one could be found.”41 In 
the same article, Air Force general Kevin P. Chilton is quoted as saying: “to 
strike a target anywhere on the globe that range from 96 hours to several hours 
maybe, 4, 5, 6 hours. (…) That would simply not be fast enough if intelligence 
arrived about a movement by Al Qaeda terrorists.”42 The preparation for such a 
hazardous use of military power continues to maintain the unceasing stalemate 
with the jihadi movement as well as with Pakistan. 
 
 In the meantime, Valid Spokespersons hardly seem to exist on the side of 
any of the parties involved but the United States. Hamed Karzai, in one of his 
interviews referred to the multi-faction insurgency by saying that one “cannot 
talk to an adversary whose only address is that of a suicide bomber’s.”43 Taliban 
negotiators in Qatar, for their part, speak of Hamed Karzai’s government as a 
party to be excluded from the first, “external” dimension of talks (with the U.S.), 
only to be included in the second, “internal” phase as but one of many Afghan 
“factions.”44 At the same time, the High Peace Council appointed by Hamed 
Karzai negotiates not so much on behalf of his government as such, with the 
predominantly Pashtun Taliban, but on the part of many of the former Northern 
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Alliance’s elements. Former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani became 
the default, least opposed choice of a leader for the body at the time when the 
Council was set up in 2010 – and he was then murdered on 20 September 2011 
by assailants coming from Pakistan who claimed to be peace envoys sent by the 
insurgents. His was one in a series of high profile assassinations that year of 
major figures opposed to the Taliban. Also questioning the usefulness of talks 
with insurgents is how there have been occasions in the past when false 
negotiators were assumed to be valid spokespersons, such as the infamous 
alleged shopkeeper from Quetta,
45
 or when elements within the Taliban have in 
the past themselves denied the legitimacy as deal brokers of those who 
negotiated supposedly on their behalf. Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to play a 
dubious role, well illustrated by the incarceration of Mullah Beradar, the former 
military commander of the Taliban, who had earlier reportedly been involved in 
direct talks with Hamed Karzai
46
 – and the dubiousness of Pakistan’s role in turn 
itself stems from the difficulty of locating where the country’s real power centre 
is (within the key military and other segments of its establishment) and how 
much control it exactly has over its own actions. 
 
The Western concept of conflict resolution in Afghanistan 
 
That talks are underway in accordance with U.S. intentions may stem on 
the part of the Taliban out of instrumental calculations about winning inevitably, 
but on the part of the U.S. they are nevertheless a logical consequence of what 
the U.S. feels it can and cannot do towards four key actors in the region: al-
Qaida, Pakistan, the Taliban, and the Afghan government. If we portray this in a 
simple scheme, U.S. options relating to these actors’ interests and preferences 
could be denoted as “D” (denial), “C” (change) and “S” (satisfy). 
 
 The United States is interested in decisively incapacitating al-Qaida (D), 
in containing radical Islamism in Pakistan (C), in neutralising or eliminating 
sources of support for jihadi organisations there (D), in offering strategic 
reassurance to Pakistan that it be not interested in seeking the alliance of jihadi 
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organisations again (S), in stopping the Taliban from violently overthrowing the 
current Afghan government (D), as well as in possibly changing the Taliban into 
a force ready to compromise in political affairs and perhaps better respect 
universal human rights (C), at the same time as it expects better governance 
from the current Afghan government, the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan [GIROA] (C). This is in response to the threat of terrorism by al-
Qaida, support by Pakistan to Jihadi organisations, support by Pakistan to actors 
(e.g. the Taliban) supporting Jihadi organisations, and support by the Taliban to 
jihadi organisations. 
 
 The current talks with the Taliban, combined with military pressure, can 
be claimed to support all of these objectives. The U.S. may be willing in the 
course of this to trade D for C vis-à-vis the Taliban: to stop fighting them if they 
change in key respects – primarily by no longer working with al-Qaida and 
secondly by agreeing to better respect human rights. Thinking in terms of Johan 
Galtung’s notion of the conflict triangle, this could address one of the key 
Pakistani incompatibilities with U.S. intentions by making D selective in their 
case: they will not be denied the chance to try to assert and protect their interests 
through the Taliban in Afghanistan, as having a non-hostile government in 
Kabul is important related to fears in Pakistan’s military establishment of 
strategic encirclement by an Indian-Afghan alliance; this of course would leave 
D in place as far as jihadi organisations are concerned. This constellation would 
in an ideal world subsequently lead to the accomplishment of C in the case of 
the Afghan government, and would at the same time be compatible with the 
accomplishment of D in the case of al-Qaida. 
 
The trade with both the Taliban and Pakistan is a difficult one, however, 
and it is made more difficult by the limited time available for the U.S. to put 
pressure on them. But even if the vague quid-pro-quos would be possible, 
question marks would still remain concerning whether C in the case of the 
Afghan government would lead to acceptable results – both in terms of human 
rights and, clearly more importantly from a U.S. perspective, in terms of its 
compatibility with denial of sanctuary to al-Qaida.  
 
Out of the relevant dyads in the above scheme, the U.S. faces a stalemate 
mostly with Pakistan (it is beyond the limitations of this chapter to address al-
Qaida’s strategic prospects on the global level, but the U.S. is largely winning 
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against al-Qaida-Central and is incapable of winning against the Taliban). U.S. 
drone strikes provided a major part of the solution to the primary challenge the 
U.S. was facing when it became involved in Afghanistan: al-Qaida’s 
elimination. This, however, seems to reproduce the problem of incompatibility 
with Pakistan. Thinking once again in terms of Johan Galtung’s conflict triangle, 
with incompatibilities on top, attitudes on the left and behaviour on the right, a 
circular interaction of the elements of the triad may be at the works. Drone 
strikes work to resolve the key U.S.-Pakistani incompatibility related to the 
presence of directly anti-U.S. jihadi organisations in the region, but they cause 
casualties, create resentment, and thus reinforce both a negative image of the 
U.S. in Pakistan and provide a beneficial milieu for anti-U.S. jihadi 
organisations within Pakistani society and within the Pakistani state and its 
military establishment.  
 
Of the five actors accounted for above, the Afghan government is most 
deprived of autonomous agency. It depends on U.S. willingness to promote its 
role for access to the negotiation process –one of the sticking points in talks with 
representatives of the Taliban. In the wake of the 2009 elections, imperfect as 
they were, and with generally negative Western attitudes towards a government 
perceived as highly corrupt, President Karzai’s administration is often targeted 
with surreal impulses from the West. It is often blamed for the conflict overall, 
and presented as a stubborn obstacle in the way of peace. 
 
On other occasions, Karzai is offered various analogical perspectives on 
conflict resolution (from Tajikistan to Bosnia) to realise how he cannot be too 
adamant in insisting on concessions or gestures from insurgents. For example, 
during a September 2012 visit by politicians from Northern Ireland, UK 
Ambassador Richard Stagg and unionist MP Jeffrey Donaldson offered him the 
following insights: “you can change things, just as France and Germany did in 
1945. However ghastly, however bloody, however deep the feuds, the hatreds, a 
moment can come, does come, when they can be addressed” (Stagg) and “You 
don't make peace with your friends. You have to be able to talk to the Taliban” 
(Donaldson).
47
 Stagg and Donaldson on this occasion were also trying to create 
the impression that they were not interested in selling a Northern Ireland 
analogy as such from the point of view of neutral outsiders – with questionable 
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credibility, and more as mere formality. In the end, their comments were 
reminiscent of Foreign Minister William Hague’s immediate reaction to 
Burhanuddin Rabbani’s assassination in September 2011, a development 
indicative of the dubious use of negotiations. Hague essentially formulated a 
response on behalf of the Afghan government, saying: “we are confident that 
this will in no way reduce the determination of the government of Afghanistan 
to continue to work for peace and reconciliation.”48 Arguably, the example of 
the British sources cited here also highlights the distinct calculations of coalition 
partners on the side of the U.S. Even a staunch ally like the UK is more eagerly 
looking for a tolerable exit than the U.S., and this makes the quest for “C” vis-à-
vis the Afghan government the more pronounced, even if this may not 
necessarily be the best route to the kind of destination envisioned above. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The blaming of the Afghan government and the regularly recurring 
utterances towards it of how it is supposed to find itself in a mutually hurting 
stalemate where everything must be done for conflict resolution right away may 
also function as convenient excuse for not trying too much to achieve lasting 
success in Afghanistan. If even “our Afghans” cannot function as agents of good 
governance – how could one have any hope in efficiently assisting Afghanistan? 
This seems to be the question implied and it is a message that resonates 
conveniently with sceptical domestic audiences. What is lost is that good 
governance is understood as one conceives it in a Western sense, within the 
current Afghan institutional framework created under decisive U.S. and Western 
influence, and in the face of violent challenges to the Afghan leadership’s 
authority. 
 
 Tolerable exit for the U.S. and Western countries can, however, only be 
assured if the forces on the side of the Afghan government are built up to be 
strong enough for truly stalemating the conflict with the insurgents once they 
will be left largely on their own. To this end, their integrity will also have to be 
preserved in the face of various subversive challenges. On this hinge, the 
success of Western efforts at manufacturing a stalemate whereby they could 
escape the Afghan battlefield with a good enough deal, even as high-ranking 
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military officers are in fact not optimistic about this. The New York Times 
recently reported that “American generals and civilian officials acknowledge 
that they have all but written off what was once one of the cornerstones of their 
strategy to end the war here: battering the Taliban into a peace deal.”49 
Apparently, the hope held by many now is this: “American officials say they 
hope that the Taliban will find the Afghan Army a more formidable adversary 
than they expect and be compelled, in the years after NATO withdraws, to come 
to terms with what they now dismiss as a “puppet” government.”50 
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